Innovation on the seed market : the role of IPRs and commercialisation rules by Hervouet, Adrien & Baudry, Marc
Innovation on the seed market : the role of IPRs and
commercialisation rules
Adrien Hervouet, Marc Baudry
To cite this version:
Adrien Hervouet, Marc Baudry. Innovation on the seed market : the role of IPRs and com-
mercialisation rules. 2014. <hal-01060565>
HAL Id: hal-01060565
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01060565
Submitted on 3 Sep 2014
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 
 
 
EA 4272 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Innovation on the seed market:  
The role of IPRs and 
commercialisation rules 
   
 
Adrien Hervouet* 
Marc Baudry** 
 
 
2014/22 
 
 
 
(*) LEMNA - Université de Nantes 
(**) EconomiX - Université de Paris Ouest Nanterre la Défense 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Laboratoire d’Economie et de Management Nantes-Atlantique 
Université de Nantes 
Chemin de la Censive du Tertre – BP 52231 
44322 Nantes cedex 3 – France 
www.univ-nantes.fr/iemn-iae/recherche 
Tél. +33 (0)2 40 14 17 17 – Fax +33 (0)2 40 14 17 49 
D
o
cu
m
en
t 
d
e 
T
ra
va
il 
W
o
rk
in
g
 P
ap
er
 
Innovation on the seed market: the role of IPRs and
commercialisation rules
Baudry Marc∗† Hervouet Adrien‡
July 8, 2014
Abstract
This article deals with the impact of legislation in the seed sector on incentives for variety
creation. The first category of rules consists in intellectual property rights and is intended to
address a problem of sequential innovation and R&D investments. The second category concerns
commercial rules that are intended to correct a problem of adverse selection. We propose a
dynamic model of market equilibrium with vertical product differentiation that enables us to take
into account the economic consequences of imposing either Plant Breeders’ Rights (PBRs) or
patents as IPRs and either compulsory registration or minimum standards as commercialisation
rules. The main result is that the combination of minimum standards and PBRs (patents) provides
higher incentives for sequential and initial innovation and may be preferred by a public regulator
when sunk investment costs are low (high) and the probability of R&D success is sufficiently high
(low).
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1 Introduction
Since the early twentieth century, public authorities have been very active/keen to set up instruments
that aim at preserving and enhancing the diversity of plants and seeds used in the agricultural sector.
Such diversity is seen as a public good (non rivalry and non excludability) subject to underinvest-
ment due to the non-cooperative behaviour of private agents in the sector (see Polasky and al., 2005,
for a review of biodiversity’s economic aspects). The use of different varieties of the same plant by
neighbourhood farmers may, for instance, limit the risk of spreading of plant diseases to the whole com-
munity of farmers. Two complementary types of instruments have been set up: Intellectual Property
Rights (IPRs) and seeds commercialisation rules. Yet, the existing literature has never dealt with them
simultaneously. Therefore, little is known about the respective merits of the different combinations of
instruments. This article aims at filling the gap and, more specifically, it focuses on the contrasted
solutions adopted in the United States and in Europe.
The rationale for defining intellectual property rights for plant varieties is that anthropic interven-
tion is essential to obtain new varieties, thanks to seed selection, for instance. Such interventions are
costly and may thus be rewarded to occur as the outcome of research and development activity of
rational economic agents (Scotchmer, 2004). Though this general idea is widely acknowledged and is
part of the international agreement on Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),
whether sui generis IPRs or patents have to be used is controversial. Partisans of sui generis IPRs
argue that inventions in the seed sector are essentially incremental/cumulative and that a "research
exemption" enabling breeders to freely develop new varieties from protected varieties created by others
is required to efficiently promote innovation and biodiversity. Cumulative innovation was discussed by
Scotchmer (1991) who gives an overview of the main related issues and O’Donoghue et al. (1998) high-
light problems arising from the length and breadth of a patent in a context of cumulative inventions.
The European Union has set up specific Plant Breeders’ Rights (PBRs) also known as Plant Variety
Rights (PVRs) or Plant Variety Protection (PVP) from the International Union for the Protection of
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New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) convention1, granted to the breeder of a new variety of plant and that
give him exclusive control over its marketing and use for a predefined number of years. This specific
IPRs system provides the research exemption described above. Partisans of patents, and among them
the United States, contest the fact that new plant varieties have to be treated as specific inventions2.
IPRs in agricultural biotechnology are discussed by Lesser (1999, 2000), Louwaars et al. (2005), Trom-
metter (2008). Ramanna and Smale (2004) and Ramanna (2006) focus on the particular IPRs system
on plant variety in India. So far, the economic literature on PBRs has mainly focused on the empirical
assessment of the effectiveness of incentives to innovate generated by intellectual property rights in
the seed sector. No definitive conclusions can be drawn from this literature. Like Alston and Venner
(2002), Carew and Devadoss (2003) attempt to test whether yields have been significantly increased
by PBRs for respectively wheat in the United States and canola in Canada. They find no significant
impact. In contrast, Diez (2002) scrutinises the role of PBRs in Spain and concludes in favour of a
positive impact. Lesser (1997) and Srinivasan (2003, 2012) assess the value of PBRs, Srinivasan (2003)
with the aim of evaluating farmers’ rights in India. Ambec et al. (2008) and Perrin and Fulginiti
(2008) examine the Coase conjecture with different assumptions concerning the behaviour of farmers
and breeders and market conditions. Lence et al. (2005) develop a theoretical model with three possible
equilibria to look at the impact of the appropriability level. More generally, literature lacks discussions
of the respective merits of patents and PBRs for stimulating innovation in the seed sector. Noticeable
exceptions are Moschini and Yerokhin (2008) and Yerokhin and Moschini (2008) who find that when
research cost is high, PBRs is not the best option. Bessen and Maskin (2009) and Nagaoka and Aoki
(2009) look at "innovation imitation" which is quite similar to research exemption, however they do
not really compare PBRs and Patents. This article is an attempt to fill a gap in existing literature.
Divergence across countries about the relevant IPRs overlaps divergence regarding the second type
of instrument; seed commercialisation rules. Commercialisation rules are specifically designed to ad-
1The UPOV promotes PBRs as IPRs on plants, at the time of writing there are 72 signatories of the UPOV convention.
The convention can be found at http://www.upov.int/upovlex/en/upov_convention.html, last accessed July 2014
2However, the US have also a PBRs system but only for sexually reproduced plants.
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dress the adverse selection problem that arises in the seed market (Akerlof, 1970). When faced with
the opportunity to buy seeds of a new plant variety or of an old plant variety that is not widely grown,
farmers need a credible assessment of the characteristics of the variety. In the absence of such a cred-
ible assessment, they would not accept to pay different prices for differentiated seeds and the eviction
of "high quality" varieties by "low quality" varieties would occur. Without the opportunity to buy
seeds that better fit their needs, farmers would then incur a loss in terms of yields and profitability.
Addressing the adverse selection problem in the seed market thus not only matters for the promotion
of biodiversity but is also important in boosting agricultural production. Instruments set up to circum-
vent the problem of adverse selection generally consist of regulatory approval based on the fulfilment
of minimum standards by commercialised seeds. How stringent these minimum standards are greatly
depends on the country. In European Union, the registration in the catalogue is mandatory and relies
on the Distinctness Uniformity and Stability (DUS) and Value for Cultivation and Use (VCU) tests
carried out by the authority competent for granting Plant Breeders’ Rights or by separate institutions,
such as public research institutes, acting on behalf of that authority. Commercialisation approval is
thus tightly linked to Plant Breeders’ Right in the European Union. By contrast, commercialisation
rules in the United States rely on less stringent criteria and, last but not least, it is not tight to the
grant of a patent on the commercialised variety (see Tripp and Louwaars, 1997, for a description of the
regulation of the seed market for some countries). As a result, a "free seed" movement has developed
in Europe to stress that the way Plants Breeders Rights are coupled with commercialisation rules is
counterproductive to the promotion of biodiversity, or even contest the principle of property rights.
The key idea is that landrace varieties contributing to biodiversity can not be commercialised because
they do not fulfil one or several of the three DUS criteria. The debate in Europe is thus bipolarised
with opponents to current commercialisation rules and/or property rights on the one side and partisans
(mainly large firms from the seed industry) of the current coupled system of PBRs and DUS based
commercialisation rules on the other side. This article tries to highlight the debate from an academic
perspective. Indeed, little has been said from an academic economist’s point of view about what com-
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bination of commercialisation rules and IPRs should be preferred and which economic agents could
gain or lose from a switch in the current system to this combination, if different from the current system.
Section 2 then proposes a theoretical model to analyse the optimal combination of commerciali-
sation rules and IPRs for the seed market. It starts with an adaptation to the seed market of the
vertical differentiation model proposed by Prescott and Visscher (1977) and used by Bresnahan (1987)
to describe the US car market, the advantage of which being that a dynamic approach of market
equilibrium is used. Plant varieties are assumed to result from a sequence of incremental inventions.
The type of IPRs that are set up by public authorities is assumed to affect market structure and
thus influences the decision to proceed or not with an incremental invention at each period. Section
3 introduces biodiversity as a public good, the level of which modifies the productivity parameter of
agricultural land and thus the demand for the different varieties of seeds. Numerical simulations based
on calibration of the model are examined. Section 4 presents a dynamic framework of the theoretical
model where combinations of commercialisation rules and intellectual property rights are compared
both in terms of incentives to innovate and in terms of welfare for different levels of R&D costs and
R&D probability of success for obtaining a new variety. Section 5 concludes.
2 The seed market in a static framework
Though innovation is intrinsically a dynamic process, we first attempt to develop a static analysis of
the seed market. The underlying idea is that the market structure is influenced by the type of IPRs
that prevails for plant varieties. Therefore, prior considering the dynamic effects of IPRs on innovation,
we have to determine their static effects. For this purpose, we adapt a standard market equilibrium
model with vertical differentiation to our problem. We first characterise the demand addressed by
heterogenous farmers to different varieties of seeds for a same crop. We then turn to the analysis of
the supply side. We distinguish between a landrace variety and "breeder" varieties. "Breeder" varieties
are supplied and created by breeders whereas the landrace already exists. Suppliers of the landrace
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variety have no market power whereas breeders of created varieties have a market power that crucially
depends on the type of IPRs that prevail for plant varieties. In addition to the distinction between a
patent regime and PBRs, we furthermore examine the impact of opting for minimum standards or a
catalogue for regulating the commercialisation of seeds.
2.1 Farmers behaviour
We consider farmers growing the same crop by means of three different types of input: land L, seeds
S and a vector Z of other inputs including capital and labor. We more specifically consider the nested
production function
Y = A Min [αS;βL; γf (Z)] ǫi (1)
where Y stands for the output level, f (Z) is a sub-production function with constant returns to
scale and ǫi is a random term with mean µi and standard deviation σi. The underlying idea is that
seeds land and the whole set of other inputs are perfect complements but that substitution between
other inputs (namely capital and labour) is possible. A is a productivity parameter, the value of which
may depend on a measure of biodiversity assumed to be exogenous for the time being. The random
term εi captures the fact that the variety i of crop grown affects both the average production level
and its variability. The random profit level π˜i for a farmer that chooses variety i with a unit price of
seeds wi may be expressed as
π˜i = P A α S εi − δi S (2)
where δi = wi +wz α/γ and wz is the minimum cost at which elements of the vector Z of variable
inputs may be combined to obtain the efficient aggregate level f (Z) = S α/γ associated to a given
quantity of seeds S. Land is treated as a fixed input so that its price does not appear in the expression
of the profit level. If land was a variable input with unit price wL, then wLα/β would have to be
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added to δi. The profit level is expressed in terms of S rather than in terms of L or Z in order to focus
on the demand of seeds.
Farmers are assumed to have a constant relative risk aversion index in the sense that the risk
premium they associate to their random profit level π˜i is proportional to the surface of land they use
and, as a direct consequence of perfect complementarity between land and seeds, to the quantity of
seeds they buy. In order to capture this attitude toward risk, the mean-standard deviation version of
Markowitz’s criteria is used (Markowitz, 1952). Accordingly, the risk adjusted profit level of a farmer
choosing variety i of the crop is given by
πi = (P A α S µi − δi S)− θ (P A α S σi) (3)
where θ is a risk aversion parameter and θ (P A α S σi) is the risk premium. Note that farmers
are assumed to choose the same variety for the whole surface area they use. Allocation of different
plots of land to different varieties is not considered. A reason for this may be, for instance, that such a
mix implies too high organisational costs. In order to analyse the optimal choice of variety, it is more
specifically convenient to rewrite the risk adjusted profit level in the following form
πi = S (A P α (µi − θ σi)− δi) (4)
Thereafter, varieties are indexed according to their rank once sorted according to the mean value
of the random component ǫi in the production function, corrected to take account of risk aversion
(i.e. i > j ⇔ µi − θ σi > µj − θ σj). Furthermore, it is assumed that there are two kinds of seeds.
The first type is variety i = 0 referred to as the landrace variety, i.e. a variety that has been used
since long ago and generates the lowest per unit of seed expected value of production with the highest
risk (i.e. µ0 < µi ∀i > 0 and σ0 > σi ∀i > 0). The second type of seeds gathers all other varieties
and is referred to as the "breeder" type. Varieties of the "breeder" type have to pass an uniformity
and stability test that aims to provide a guarantee that production will not vary due to heterogeneity
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among seeds of a same variety. For these varieties, the risk affecting production is thus limited to
meteorological conditions and is thus assumed to be of the same magnitude for all of them (i.e. σi = σ
∀i > 0). As a result, "breeders" varieties are differentiated only in terms of their value of µi that may
be thought of as a quality parameter. Farmers are heterogeneous in terms of the productivity of their
land measured by parameter A. Under these additional assumptions, the optimal choice of variety for
farmers is formally identical to the optimal choice of quality by consumers in example 4 of Prescott
and Visscher (1977). More specifically, the linear utility function of consumers with a heterogeneous
marginal rate of substitution is replaced by the risk adjusted profit level which is linear with respect of
parameter A that captures heterogeneity among farmers. Farmers prefer variety i to variety j if and
only if πi > πj . This inequality yields
A >
δi−δj
P α ((µi−θ σi)−(µj−θ σj))
if i > j
A <
δi−δj
P α ((µi−θ σi)−(µj−θ σj))
if i < j
(5)
Farmers who choose variety i among a set {0, · · · , I} of varieties of a same crop are thus farmers
with a productivity parameter A of land that satisfies
δ0
P α η0
< A < δ1−δ0
P α (η1−η0)
for i = 0
δi−δi−1
P α (ηi−ηi−1)
< A < δi+1−δi
P α (ηi+1−ηi)
for 0 < i < N
δi−δi−1
P α (ηi−ηi−1)
< A for i = N
(6)
with ηi = µi− θ σi and ηj = µj − θ σj . The left hand side threshold for i = 0 follows the condition
that farmers decide to grow variety i = 0 of the crop if and only if they make a positive risk adjusted
profit with that variety. If this condition of a positive risk adjusted profit is satisfied for i = 0 then
it is also satisfied when farmers prefer a variety i > 0 because this choice implies that they reach a
higher level of risk adjusted profit.
For the problem to make sense, it is expected that the minimum costs δi (i ∈ {0, · · · , I}) per unit
of seed are consistent with a positive demand for each variety. Therefore, we assume that Amax >
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(δN − δN−1) / (P α (ηN − ηN−1)) (i.e. there is a positive demand for variety i = N) and that Amin <
(δ1 − δ0) / (P α (η1 − η0)) (i.e. there is a positive demand for variety i = 0). We also introduce
the simplifying assumption that production is profitable for all farmers. For this purpose, assumption
Amin > δ0/ (P α η0) is added. It guaranties that farmers with the lowest productivity can make profits
at least by choosing variety i = 0. Farmers may also be heterogeneous as regard seeds S they use
but their distribution in terms of S is supposed to be independent of their distribution in terms of A.
Given these assumptions and the fact that δi = wi + wz α/γ for all varieties, the demand system for
the different varieties may be expressed in terms of their prices wi (i ∈ {0, · · · , I}) as follows
qi =


q
(
w1−w0
P α (η1−η0)
−Amin
)
for i = 0
q
(
wi+1−wi
P α (ηi+1−ηi)
− wi−wi−1
P α (ηi−ηi−1)
)
for 0 < i < N
q
(
Amax −
wi−wi−1
P α (ηi−ηi−1)
)
for i = N
(7)
with q = ML 1
α
/Amax − Amin where M is the number of farmers and L the average surface they
use3. M L 1
α
is a measure of market size for seeds.
2.2 Breeders behavior
In a static framework, the behaviour of breeders of created varieties is crucially influenced by the type
of IPRs that prevails for plant varieties and that shapes the structure of the seed market. We argue
that a patent regime is associated with either a monopolistic-monovariety structure or a monopolistic-
multivariety structure on the breeders side, whereas a PBRs regime more or less leads to an oligopolistic
market structure. Seeds for the landrace variety just have to be produced at a constant unit cost c0,
which implies that they are supplied in a competitive context and are priced at their constant unit
cost. We examine and compare pricing under the two IPRs regimes and also discuss the incidence of
switch from minimum standards to a catalogue for commercialisation rules on the seed market.
3The way the average surface appears in the demand system directly follows on from the simplifying assumption that
the distribution of surface and productivity are independent.
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2.2.1 Pricing with a patent system
For ease of presentation, we start with the case of a patent system to protect plant varieties. It is
necessary to remember that varieties of the "breeder" type are ranked according to the increasing
value of the quality parameter µi. The implicit assumption is that the development of "breeder" type
varieties begins with variety i = 1 and proceeds variety by variety from i to i+ 1 up to variety i = N
with the highest quality level. In this sense, varieties i > 1 are incremental inventions developed from
the initial invention i = 1. Since patents convey an exclusivity right on all incremental inventions
that may be derived from an initial invention, we consider that the inventor of variety i = 1 has de
facto a monopolistic position on all other varieties4. For a given number N of developed varieties, the
objective of the initial inventor is to maximise the joint profit of supplying all varieties
Max
{wi,··· ,wN}
N∑
i=1
(wi − ci)qi (8)
where ci stands for the constant unit cost of producing seeds for variety i. The corresponding first
order conditions for i ∈ {i, . . . , N − 1} may be written as
wi =
ci
2
+
wi+1
2
ηi − ηi−1
ηi+1 − ηi−1
+
wi−1
2
ηi+1 − ηi
ηi+1 − ηi−1
+
(
wi+1 − ci+1
2
)
ηi − ηi−1
ηi+1 − ηi−1
+
(
wi−1 − ci−1
2
)
ηi+1 − ηi
ηi+1 − ηi−1
(9)
Note that for i = 1 we have wi−1 = c0 so that the last term vanishes. For i = N , the first order
condition is
wN = P α
ηN − ηN−1
2
Amax +
cN
2
+
wN−1
2
+
wN−1 − cN−1
2
(10)
This set of first order conditions is linear with respect to the unknown prices wi (i ∈ {1, . . . , N})
4If the production of incremental varieties is licensed to other firms then the inventor of the initial variety is assumed
to extract the rent of the licensee so that he formally behaves as if he was in a monopolistic position.
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so that it is expected that one and only one solution exists. In order to determine this solution, we
re-express (9) and (10) in terms of the threshold values of the productivity parameter involved in
(6). Let Aii−1 denote the threshold value
wi−wi−1
Pα (ηi−ηi−1)
of the productivity parameter A above which a
farmer prefers variety i to variety i− 1. Then, (9) and (10) simplify to
Aii−1 =
Amax
2
+
1
2
ci − ci−1
P α (ηi − ηi−1)
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N} (11)
that directly yields the optimal expression of each threshold. According to (11), a monopolistic
pricing implies that the value of thresholds remain unchanged when the total number of varieties
increases. It follows on from this first result and from the demand system (7) that the equilibrium
quantity sold for each variety is not affected by an incremental invention taking the form of a new
variety with a higher value of parameter η except for the breeder variety prior to the new breeder
variety due to truncated demand resulting from the arrival of the latest variety. Furthermore, the
equation (11) enables us to determine a necessary and sufficient condition for the monopolist to supply
each of the varieties i ∈ {1, ..., N} in order to maximise its total profit.
Proposition 1 A monopolist breeder optimally supplies each of varieties i ∈ {1, ..., N} if and only if
the sequence {ci, ηi} of unit costs and quality indexes forms a convex curve in space {c, η}.
Proof 1 According to equation 11 and to the demand system 7, a positive demand is addressed to each
variety i ∈ {1, ..., N} if and only if ci−ci−1
ηi−ηi−1
increases with i, which is equivalent to the stated convexity
property.
Under the condition stated in Proposition 1 and using the expression wi−wi−1
P α (ηi−ηi−1)
of threshold
Ann−1, we conclude that prices are defined by the following recursive formula for a monopolist:
wi = wi−1 +A
i
i−1P α (ηi − ηi−1) ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N} (12)
Given that w0 = c0 because multiple suppliers of the landrace variety compete under perfect
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competition, formula (12) yields the following optimal value of prices:
wi = c0 +
Amax
2
P α (ηi − η0) +
1
2
(ci − c0) ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N} (13)
Formula (13) is a key element in stating the Proposition 2
Proposition 2 Equilibrium prices for varieties optimally supplied by a multi-product monopolist are
unaffected by an incremental invention.
Proof 2 The result follows on from the fact that,according to 13, the equilibrium price for a variety
only depends on its unit cost and technical characteristics and on that of the landrace variety.
Conversely, Proposition 3 yields a necessary and sufficient condition for a monopolist breeder to
supply only the highest quality.
Proposition 3 A monopolist breeder optimally supplies the sole highest quality variety i = N if and
only if the sequence {ci, ηi} of unit costs and quality indexes forms a concave curve in space {c, η}.
Proof 3 According to equation 11 and to the demand system 7, a positive demand is addressed to
variety i = N whereas no positive demand is addressed to varieties i ∈ {1, ..., N − 1} if and only if
ci−ci−1
ηi−ηi−1
decreases with i, which is equivalent to the stated concavity property.
Under the condition stated in Proposition 3, the formula (10) with η0 in place of ηN−1 and c0 in
place of cN−1 directly yields the optimal price wN . We then deduce the following Proposition.
Proposition 4 The optimal price wN of the highest quality variety of seeds for a monoproduct monop-
olist is identical to the optimal price of the same variety chosen by a multiproduct monopolist breeder
that would optimally supply all varieties i ∈ {1, ..., N − 1}.
Proof 4 Replacing ηN−1 by η0 and cN−1 by c0 in formula (10) and rearranging yields the same optimal
price for variety N than the one obtained with equation (13).
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As will be emphasised later in the article, Propositions 2 and 4 play a crucial role in analysing and
comparing prices under a patent regime versus PBRs, at least when N = 2.
Figure 1: Impact of a switch from minimum standards to the catalogue
In order to determine the impact of choosing either minimum standards or a catalogue as commer-
cial rules, we draw the isoprice and isoquant curves for a given variety i in space {σ0, c0}. Indeed, the
key difference between minimum standards and a catalogue is that, in the event of a catalogue, seeds
of the landrace variety have to pass the same DUS test than seeds created by breeders. Therefore, the
standard deviation σ0 characterising the random component affecting the profit of farmers that use
the landrace has to be lowered to the same level than that of farmers that use breeders’ varieties. This
implies a higher unit cost c0 for seeds of the landrace variety. Whether the breeder is a monoproduct
monopolist or a multiproduct monopolist does not matter for isoprice curves because the optimal price
is formally given by the same equation (13) whatever the variety i considered. Moreover, one easily
checks that these curves are linear and decreasing in space {σ0, c0} and move upwards when they are
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associated to a higher price. Starting from σ0 = σ
m
0 and c0 = c
m
0 with minimum standards, the
adoption of a catalogue induces a move somewhere inside the hatched area in Figure 1. If a small de-
crease of σ0 is enough to pass the DUS test as required for registration in a catalogue and this decrease
results in a sufficiently high additional unit cost for the landrace variety i = 0, then the combination
{σc0, c
c
0} associated with a catalogue will be above the initial isoprice curve and the prices of varieties
i ∈ {1, ..., N} supplied by the monopolist breeder will increase. An opposite result is obtained if σc0
is small compared to σm0 whereas c
c
0 is close to c
m
0 . If the breeder is a monoproduct monopolist, the
quantity qN of variety N optimally supplied is
qN = q
(
Amax
2
−
1
2P α
cN − c0
(µN − µ0)− θ (σN − σ0)
)
(14)
Then, the isoquant is also linear and decreasing in space {σ0, c0} and move upwards when associated to
a higher quantity. Thus, the consequence for the optimal supply of variety N of a switch from minimum
standards to a catalogue are similar to those already obtained for the price of variety N . Whether
the isoquant is higher than the isoprice (as represented in Figure 1) or not is unclear. Nevertheless,
combining variations of the price and of the quantity, we conclude that the profit generated by variety
N will increase (respectively decrease) if σc0 is close to (respectively far from) σ
m
0 and c
c
0 is far from
(respectively close to) cm0 . If the breeder is a multiproduct monopolist, then the analysis for the
quantity qN of the highest quality variety is formally identical to that for the monoproduct monopolist.
The analysis for lower quality varieties is simpler because the corresponding optimal quantities qi
i ∈ {1, ..., N − 1} are invariant with respect to σ0 and c0.The sign of the variation of the associated
profits is thus identical to the sign of the variation for the corresponding optimal prices. All these
results are summarised in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 Under a patent regime, if the switch from minimum standards to a catalogue results
in a small drop of σ0 but a sharp increase of c0, then prices, and the markup, of all the varieties that
a monopolist breeder will find optimal to supply and the associated profits will increase. The optimal
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quantity of the highest quality variety will also increase whereas the quantities of lower quality optimally
supplied, if any, will remain unchanged.
Proof 5 See Figure 1 and the comments above.
According to Proposition 5, it is thus expected that, under a patent regime, breeders will argue
in favour of the catalogue rule rather than in favour of minimum standards only if they think that
the additional unit cost incurred by suppliers of seeds for landraces to meet the DUS criteria is high
enough compared to the resulting reduction of productivity uncertainty that affects farmers. We now
turn to the case of a PBRs regime.
2.2.2 Pricing with a PBRs system
Due to the research exemption, we consider that with a PBRs system each variety is created by a
different firm so that the market structure for seeds is oligopolistic. Of course, it may happen that a
same firm creates several varieties, an eventuality that we do not take into account for two reasons.
First, we want to stress the difference between PBRs and patents in terms of market structure and
market equilibrium. Second, in the dynamic framework introduced later in the paper, we focus on
a two-period analysis where only a monopolistic or a duopolistic market structure may arise. In an
oligopolistic framework, prices are obtained as the outcome of a Bertand Nash game in prices. For a
given number N of developed varieties, the objective of each breeder i is to maximise his own profit
vi of supplying variety i given prices of all other varieties:
Max
wi
(wi − ci)qi (15)
The corresponding first order condition is
wi =
ci
2
+
wi+1
2
ηi − ηi−1
ηi+1 − ηi−1
+
wi−1
2
ηi+1 − ηi
ηi+1 − ηi−1
(16)
for i ∈ {i, . . . , N − 1} and
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wN = P α
ηN − ηN−1
2
Amax +
cN
2
+
wN−1
2
(17)
for i = N . (16) and (17) define the reaction functions characterising the game in prices. The
linearity of theses reaction functions guarantees that if a solution exists it is unique. Nevertheless, it
seems that it is not possible to rearrange this set of reaction functions in terms of the sole thresholds
Aii−1. It is thus expected that, contrary to what happens in the monopolistic context, both prices and
the values of thresholds vary when the total number of varieties increases. Note also that, according
to (16) and (17) and the fact that ηi > ηi−1 ∀i ∈ {1, ..., N}, reaction functions have a positive slope.
We thus obtain the following characteristic of the game in prices:
Proposition 6 There is strategic complementarity between prices.
Proof 6 Reaction functions are increasing with respect to strategic decisions of other players which
defines strategic complementarity.
Proposition 6 is a key element for the graphical comparison of monopolistic and oligopolistic pricing
when N = 2.
As in the case of a patent regime, isoprice and isoquant curves are useful to highlight the conse-
quences of adopting either minimum standards or a catalogue for commercialisation rules. Nevertheless,
we focus here on the case where N = 2 because we are not able to find a simple analytical expression of
optimal prices for a generic value of N . Proposition summarises the results as regards the consequences
of a change in commercialisation rules.
Proposition 7 If the corresponding change in the unit cost c0 and the standard deviation σ0 of pro-
ductivity are of limited magnitude and the variation of σ0 is small enough compared to the variation
of c0, then the strengthening of commercial rules resulting from a switch from minimum standards to
a catalogue induces an increase of the price of breeders’ varieties and an increase of the quantities of
seeds sold to famers for these varieties.
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Proof 7 See Appendix A.
In spite of the similitude between Propositions 5 and 7, these two Propositions neither mean that
the change in prices and quantities under a PBR regime and under a patent regime will have the same
magnitude, nor that it will have the same sign. This is expected to happen only in the polar cases
where the variation of σ0 is small compared to that of c0 (prices and quantities of breeders’ varieties
then increase) or where the variation of σ0 is high compared to that of c0 (prices and quantities of
breeders’ varieties then decrease).
2.2.3 Comparative analysis of pricing
Although a standard result in economics states that, for a single product, the markup of a monopolist
is higher than that for any other market structure, it is not that obvious to extend it to a multiproduct
context. Indeed, it is not intuitively unconceivable that in order to maximise its total profit a multi-
product monopolist optimally chooses to charge a higher price for the high quality good but a lower
price for low quality goods, for instance. Moreover, when the monopolist optimally decides to supply
the sole highest quality good, the demand system is substantially affected and the comparison of prices
is complicated. Therefore, it is worth providing some analytical results as regards the comparison of
optimal prices with an oligopolistic versus monopolistic market structure. The focus is on the case of
two breeder varieties. The reason for this is that in the dynamic framework that is analysed latter in
the paper, R&D investments have to be analysed backwards and the model is limited to two periods
for computational tractability so that N = 2 at the best.
Figure 2 illustrates the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium of the price game in the second period when two
different firms have an exclusivity right on each variety of the "breeder" type. Such a market structure
may arise only under a PBR regime.The dark line
(
AA
)
represents the reaction function w∗1 (w2) of
the firm providing variety 1. The expression of this reaction function solves the first order condition
(16) for i = 1. One easily checks that, due to the assumption ηi > ηi−1 ∀i ∈ {1, ..., N}, the slope
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Figure 2: Bertrand-Nash equilibrium with N=2
of the reaction function w∗1 (w2) in space {w1, w2} exceeds unity. By construction, isoprofit curves
for firm 1 admit their minimum in space {w1, w2} at the crossing point with the reaction function
w∗1 (w2). They decrease (respectively increase) with w1 for all values of w1 lower (respectively higher)
than this minimum. They all admit w1 = c1 as an asymptote when w2 tends to infinity Similarly,
the dark line
(
BB
)
represents the reaction function w∗2 (w1) of the firm providing variety 2 and its
expression solves the first order condition (17) for N = 2. The slope of the reaction function w∗2 (w1)
in space {w1, w2} amounts to
1
2 . By construction, isoprofit curves for firm 2 admit their minimum in
space {w2, w1} at the crossing point with the reaction function w
∗
2 (w1). They decrease (respectively
increase) with w2 for all values of w2 lower (respectively higher) than this minimum and admit w2 = c2
as a horizontal asymptote in space {w1, w2}. Finally, isoprofit curves for both firms are associated
with higher profit levels as they shift further from the origin. The oligopolistic equilibrium for the
prices of varieties i = 1 and i = 2 is characterised by the coordinates w1 = w
oli
1 and w2 = w
oli
2 of the
intersection Eoli of the two reaction functions if and only if the intersection lies above the bisectrix in
space {w1, w2}. Otherwise the demand for variety i = 1 as defined in (7) would generate a negative
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value, thus indicating that variety i = 1 would actually be abandoned. Profit levels at point Eoli for
firm 1 and firm 2 are respectively denoted voli1 and v
oli
2 .
Some indications on the relative position in Figure 2 of optimal prices for a multiproduct monopolist
when N = 2, compared to the oligopolistic price equilibrium, may also be obtained. Indeed, a standard
result of the maximisation program (8) of the sum of profits for N = 2 is that the unique interior
solution to first order conditions (16) and (17) is a point of tangency between isoprofit curves of varieties
1 and 2. Such a tangency may be obtained only on subsets of Figure 2 where isoprofit curves for both
firms are either decreasing or increasing in space {w1, w2}. According to the previous discussion about
the general shape of isocurves, we know that isoprofit curves for variety 1 are decreasing in space
{w1, w2} above the line associated to the reaction function w
∗
1 (w2) and are increasing behind the same
line whereas isoprofit curves for variety 2 are decreasing in space {w1, w2} behind the line associated
to the reaction function w∗2 (w1) and are increasing above this line. Thus a point of tangency between
isoprofit curves may be found only inside the area OAEoliB or inside the cone BEoliA. Inside the area
OAEoliB isoprofit curves are associated with a lower profit level than at point Eoli for both varieties
of crops. A monopolist would then be better off choosing Eoli rather than such a tangency point. The
solution for monopolistic pricing can thus only belong to the cone BEoliA where isoprofit curves are
associated with higher profit levels for both varieties. Moreover, for a monopolist to supply variety 1
it is required that w2 exceeds w1 so that the equilibrium point E
mon (with coordinates w1 = w
mon
1
and w2 = w
mon
2 and profit levels v
mon
1 and v
mon
2 ) lies above the bisectrix. Note that according to (12)
this condition is fulfilled if the technical condition ηi > ηi−1 ∀i ∈ {1, ..., N} and the cost condition
ci > ci−1 ∀i ∈ {1, ..., N} are satisfied (one of the two inequalities being strict for each i). We can then
write the following Proposition:
Proposition 8 The optimal price charged by a monopolist for a variety, whether it optimally chooses
to be monoproduct or it rather opts for multiproduction, is always higher than the price of the variety
when each variety is supplied by a different breeder.
Proof 8 The result directly follows from the analysis of Figure 2 and Proposition 4.
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The point in Proposition 8 is that the result does not only applies to the case of a multiproduct
monopolist but also to the case of a monoproduct monopolist.
3 The effects of endogenous biodiversity
Biodiversity is often seen as a natural protection of crops against risks of a massive attack by predators
or as a natural mean for crops to adapt to environmental change (see e.g. Polasky and al., 2005; Altieri,
1999). Nevertheless underinvestment in the preservation and development of biodiversity is also often
stressed. Such an underinvestment may be thought off as the outcome of a "tragedy of the commons".
Indeed, efforts to preserve and develop biodiversity on his own fields by a farmer do not only benefit to
himself but also to the neighbouring farmers. The existence of this spillover effect implies that a farmer
can not fully internalize the benefits that accrue from his efforts and symmetrically for his neighbours.
Biodiversity is thus a common resource for which each farmer is subject to a lack of incentives in
terms of preservation and development efforts. Endogenous biodiversity is dealt with in this section
by slightly modifying the specification of the model presented in the previous section.
3.1 Biodiversity as a common resource
In order to tackle with the endogeneity of biodiversity and with its positive external effects, it is assumed
that the productivity parameter A introduced in the production function (1) linearly depends on a
measure bio of biodiversity:
A = A+ λbio (18)
where A is an heterogeneous component that varies from a farmer to an other one and λ is a
constant parameter. A reflects the minimum productivity level that would be obtained in the absence
of biodiversity and λbio is the part of productivity to be attributed to biodiversity. We assume that A is
uniformly distributed on the interval
[
Amin, Amax
]
so that A is also uniformly distributed on an interval
20
[Amin, Amax] with Amin = Amin+ λbio and Amax = Amax+ λbio. A direct and convenient consequence
of this specification is that the derivation of the demand system and market equilibrium for a given
level bio of biodiversity is similar to that presented in the previous section. What makes the model
different is that most usual biodiversity measures depend on the number of varieties and possibly on
the quantity of each variety that is effectively grown. The level of biodiversity is then endogenous and
bio has to be found as a fixed point of the model. Unfortunately the demand system and equilibrium
prices conditional on the level of bio are highly nonlinear with respect to this biodiversity measurement
so that we are not able to find the corresponding fixed point analytically. The problem is compounded
by the fact that commonly used measures of biodiversity are themselves highly nonlinear expressions
of the quantities of crops of the different varieties. We more specifically consider three different index
of biodiversity:
The first and simplest way to measure biodiversity is to count the number N of varieties effectively
grown at a given period of time. Note that for a variety to be taken into account it is required that
it is not only supplied but also effectively bought and grown by farmers. Put another way, N is not
the total number of varieties listed in a catalogue but the total number of varieties effectively found
in fields (Baumgärtner, 2006). Even this simple measurement of biodiversity is endogenous because
firms at the two periods of the model can decide to invest in R&D and create a new variety or not.
It is expected, for instance, that above some threshold of the sunk R&D cost K, firms prefer not to
invest. The second way to capture biodiversity is to use is the Simpson index defined as
D =
N∑
i=0
g2i (19)
where gi is the share of variety i in the total quantity of seeds bought
5. D reflects the probability
that two randomly selected units of land are cultivated with the same variety. It is actually more
convenient to use the index of diversity E defined as 1−D. Indeed, E goes to zero when biodiversity
decreases and is bounded by one as biodiversity is very high, which is more consistent with the way
5Due to the perfect complementarity between seeds and land, this is also the share of total land allocated to variety
i.
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biodiversity is assumed to affect the production function (1) through the productivity parameter
defined in (18). The third way to measure biodiversity is to compute the Shannon-Wiener index
derived from the concept of entropy
H = −
N∑
i=0
gi ∗ ln (gi) (20)
with, by convention, gi ∗ ln (gi) = 0 for gi = 0. Again, it is convenient to introduce a normalisation
of this index known as the Pielou index
P =
H
ln(N)
(21)
When P = 1, each variety has exactly the same share of the total land cultivated and biodiversity
is at its maximum. When biodiversity is very low, P tends to zero.
In further section, the Simpson index of diversity is chosen for two reason: it is similar to the
Herfindahl and Hirschmann Index (HHI), commonly used in industrial economics to measure market
concentration, and it facilitates the search of a fixed point needed to calibrate the model.
3.2 Model calibration
For the purpose of assessing the impact of endogenous biodiversity on market equilibrium, a numerical
calibration of the model is needed. This calibration enables us to find a fixed point for the market
shares given the biodiversity feedback effect on productivity. Parameters numerical values are shown
in Table 1, they all correspond to the case of wheat in France. They were worked out using data
from Groupement National Interprofessionnel des Semences (GNIS), from the Farm Accountancy Data
Network (FADN) and from Banque de France. FADN provides average data on the agricultural sector
of the European Union, and the GNIS on the seed sector. In addition, the GNIS performs tests to
certify seeds.
In order to calculate the first (constant) part of Amin and Amax we use the variation of yield by
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Table 1: Parameters
P 19e/q µ0 1
Lmean 14.42 µ1 1.04
Mfarmers 356,070 µ2 1.08
c0standards 31.25e/q σ0standards 0.2
c0catalogue 40.56e/q σi 0.18
ci 49.85e/q λ 13
Amin 20 + λbio cz ∗ α/γ 722
Amax 110 + λbio θ 0.25
hectare of wheat in different populations of farmers available on FADN. The second part enables us to
take into account biodiversity. λ was set to a value that makes the impact of biodiversity significant
(it amounts to about 20% of the global productivity for the median farmer in our simulations, under
the assumption of uniform distribution for parameter A). Data for the unit cost cm0 of farm-saved
seeds with minimum standards, for the unit cost cm0 of farm-saved seeds with a catalogue and for
the unit cost ci for certified seeds were collected from GNIS. On the basis of information provided by
experts from the Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA), the unit cost ci incurred to
produce breeders varieties is assumed to be invariant with respect to the quality index ηi = µi − θ σi
of seeds. Consequently, the sequence of unit costs {ci} is concave with respect to the sequence {ηi} of
the quality index and, according to Proposition 3, we conclude that a monopoly will prefer to supply
only the higher quality of seeds. Knowing that the seed unit cost represents roughly six percent6 of the
total cost, the cost cz ∗ α/γ of other inputs was evaluated to 722e/q. The mean of the random term
ǫ0, µ0, is normalised to 1 and µi is worked out through a ratio of the amount of seeds required to sow
one hectare with farm-saved seeds and certified seeds, here 1.41.3 = 1.076. Parameter σ0 and σi were set
so as to obtain realistic prices for breeders varieties in our simulations. σi is lower than σ0 because of
the homogeneity and stability criteria. There are 356,070 farmers in France with an average acreage
of 14.42 hectares of land allocated to wheat7. This information allows us to calculate the market size
(Lmean ∗Mfarmers ∗ numbers of seeds by hectares). Finally, based on Brink and McCarl (1978) and
6According to FADN database.
7The FADN only takes professional farmers into account, for more information visit http://ec.europa.eu/
agriculture/rica/, last accessed June 2014.
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Saha (1997), we set the risk aversion parameter θ to 0.25.
3.3 Numerical Results
Prior presenting the results of our numerical simulations, it is worth recalling the main policy options.
The PBRs system leads to an oligopoly with Bertrand-Nash equilibrium while the patent system gives
a monopoly position to one breeder. An alternative to varieties created by breeders consists in buying
landrace seeds, which are priced at their unit cost. In order to remedy to information asymmetries
about the quality of seeds, two kind of commercialisation rules are considered: minimum standards or
a catalogue. Registration in the catalogue requires to pass the DUS and VCU tests. Landrace seeds
can succeed in passing these tests only at an additional unit cost. In counterpart, if they meet these
criteria, the uncertainty surrounding the performance of landrace seeds is lowered to the same level
than the one characterising seeds of the breeders varieties. Crossing the different criteria generates
four cases. Firstly, a "European case" with PBRs-catalogue rules. In contrast, there is a "US case"
with Patent-minimum standards rules. The two other possibilities are a PBR-standards minimum case
and a patent-catalogue case. These four cases, which somewhat simplifies the reality (a PBRs system
and a patent system can make together) give an idea of the impact of regulation in the seed industry.
Note that, given the values of parameters reported in Table 1, some farmers will have a negative
profit and will prefer not to grow wheat. Two reasons can explain this result: subsides provided by
public authorities in the context of the Common Agricultural Policy are disregarded and only a part
of farmers output, and thus of profit, is computed. Indeed, farmers with a low yield are mostly not
specialised in cereals.
With only one breeder variety that compete with the landrace (i.e. with N = 1), results for the
PBRs system and the Patent system are similar whatever the rule for commercialisation of seeds.
Recall that the profit for suppliers of the landrace amounts to zero because this market segment con-
stitutes a competitive fringe for the monopoly breeder that supplies variety 1 (see Table 2). In the
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catalogue case the seed market splits into roughly 45% for the landrace seeds and 55% for the "breeder"
seeds. In comparison, the monopolist, in the minimum standards case , supplies only 47% of the seed
market. The difference is due to a higher ratio between the price of the breeder variety and the price
of the landrace variety in the minimum standards case (2.43584) than in the catalogue case (1.85774).
Biodiversity, as measured by the Simpson index, is slightly higher with minimum standards than with
a catalogue rule, but it seems that the result is highly sensitive to the values of parameters. Unsur-
prisingly, the price of seeds for the breeder variety and the profit of the breeder are higher for the
catalogue case than for minimum standards case whereas the risk-adjusted profit of farmers is lower.
The net effect produces a higher total welfare in the minimum standards case.
Table 2: Results with one "breeder" seed
Minimum standards Catalogue
Varieties landrace breeder 1 landrace breeder 1
µi 1 1.04 1 1.04
wi (e/quintal) 31.25 76.12 40.56 76.8
qi (thousand) 3752 3435 3222 3966
πi (million) . 90 . 106.9
Amin(E) 26.5 26.4
threshold2 73.5 66.7
Amax(E) 116.5 116.4
πfarmers (euros) 3727 3445
Welfare (billion) 1.346 1334
Ea 0.499 0.494
a
E means Simpson index of diversity
With two breeder varieties (i.e. with N = 2), the four cases appear because of dissociation between
the PBR and the patent system (see Table 3). With the oligopolistic market structure favoured by
the PBRs system, the incremental innovation (variety 2) induces a decrease of the price of variety 1
compared to the case N = 1 whereas this variety is no longer supplied under the patent regime (see
Proposition 3). In accordance with Proposition 8, the price of the variety 2 is higher in the patent
system than in the PBRs system, whatever the commercial rule that is in force.
Comparing the European case with the American case, we notice that the US system is better for
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breeders who will have a higher profit than in the context of European rules. Regarding farmers, the
EU system seems preferable because the conjunction of competition between breeders, that is allowed
with the PBRs system, and sequential innovation pushes prices down for variety 1. Nevertheless, the
total welfare is lower in the European context because higher risk adjusted profits for farmers do not
counterbalance the lower profits of breeders. The Simpson biodiversity index is slightly higher in the US
system in spite of the absence of variety 1. This results clearly emphasises that measuring biodiversity
as a simple count of varieties grown by farmers may be misleading and that the concentration of market
shares matters.
Looking at the four cases all together, the maximum profit that a breeder can earn is found in
the patent-catalogue case thanks to higher prices whereas the PBR-standards situation is the best
for farmers due to lower prices of the seeds of both breeder varieties and the landrace variety. As a
consequence, the best situation for total welfare is found in the PBR-standards case. By contrast, the
value of the Simpson biodiversity index is far from being the highest in the PBR-standards case. This
finding shows that although higher competition lowers market concentration, it does not systemati-
cally enhance biodiversity in spite of the strong link between the two concepts when biodiversity is
measured by the Simpson index. Our simulations indicate that, in a static framework, strengthening
competition thanks to PBRs in place of patents may lower the price of the highest quality of seeds
more drastically than it does for other qualities of seeds, which induces a concentration of the market in
favour of the two polar qualities (the highest quality of seeds and landrace seeds) but at the detriment
of biodiversity. More generally, our simulation results stress that ceteris paribus (i.e. for unchanged
commercialisation rules) PBRs do not promote biodiversity compared to a patent regime, at least in a
static framework. Conversely, ceteris paribus (i.e. for an unchanged IPRs regime) minimum standards
in place of a catalogue commercialisation rule is more efficient at promoting biodiversity. Neverthe-
less the story can substantially differ if we consider incentives to invest in R&D in a dynamic framework.
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Table 3: Results with two "breeder" seeds
Oligopoly+Catologue ("European"
case)
Monopoly+Catalogue
Varieties landrace breeder 1 breeder 2 landrace breeder 1 breeder 2
µi 1 1.04 1.08 1 1.04 1.08
wi (e/quintal) 40.54 56.16 84.39 40.54 75.35 108.31
qi (thousand) 249 1857 5082 2888 0 4301
πi (million) . 12 176 . 0 251
Amin(E) 25.6 26.2
threshold2 28.7 .
threshold3 52 62.4
Amax(E) 115.6 116.2
πfarmers (euros) 3789 3601
Welfare (billion) 1.536 1.534
Ea 0.432 0.481
Oligopoly+Standards Monopoly+Standards ("US" case)
Seeds landrace breeder 1 breeder 2 landrace breeder 1 breeder 2
µi 1 1.04 1.08 1 1.04 1.08
wi (e/quintal) 31.25 54.42 83.66 31.25 74.46 107.7
qi (thousand) 942 1271 4974 3183 0 4005
πi (million) . 6 168 . 0 232
Amin(E) 26.1 26.4
threshold2 37.9 .
threshold3 53.9 66.3
Amax(E) 116.1 116.4
πfarmers (euros) 3966 3707
Welfare (billion) 1.586 1.552
Ea 0.473 0.493
a
E means Simpson index of diversity
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4 Endogenous innovation in a dynamic framework
PBRs aim at generating higher incentives than patents in favour of variety creation through incremental
inventions. A comprehensive analysis of the respective merits of PBRs and patents thus requires to
extend the static analysis presented so far to a dynamic framework. For this purpose, we consider a
two periods model. Market equilibrium at each period is determined in accordance with the static
analysis presented above but the number of varieties is endogenous. For a new variety to be available,
breeders have to invest a sunk cost in R&D and the outcome of the innovation process is uncertain.
This section examines how the incentives to participate to the innovation race and the outcome of the
innovation race at the two periods are affected by the IPRs system and the commercialisation rules
in force. The problem is solved backwards, starting first with the incremental invention at the second
period and then proceeding with the initial, drastic, invention at period one.
4.1 Incentives for an incremental invention
4.1.1 Incentives with a patent system
According to the calibration of the model presented in Table 1 and Proposition 3, we know that a
monopolist will always choose to supply only the highest quality variety. Moreover, a patent regime
confers the exclusivity of the opportunity to research and develop the incremental variety to the breeder
of the initial variety. Hence, the breeder of the initial variety will engage in R&D in order to obtain
the second variety characterised by a higher quality if and only if
(Λvmon2 + (1− Λ)v
mon
1 )− FC > v
mon
1 (22)
where Λ is the probability of success, FC is the fixed cost of R&D, vmon1 is the flow of profit for the
monopolist with variety 1 whereas vmon2 > v
mon
1 is the flow of profit for the monopolist with variety 2.
The left-hand of equation (22) represents what earns the breeder if he innovates minus its fixed cost
of R&D and the right-hand represents what he earns if it does not innovate. Equation (22) simplifies
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as follows
Λ(vmon2 − v
mon
1 ) > FC (23)
where the left-hand is the expected gross benefit of the breeder that accrues from an engagement in
R&D and the right-hand is the associated cost. According to the calibration presented in Table 1, the
increment vmon2 − v
mon
1 in profit flows is slightly higher with a catalogue (144.1) than with minimum
standards (142).
4.1.2 Incentives with a PBRs system
Under a PBRs system, either the incumbent breeder that already supplies variety n = 1 or a new
breeder are able to invest in a R&D program that aims at obtaining the higher quality variety n = 2
at period 2. An innovation race occurs if the two breeders decide to engage in R&D. This innovation
race has two opposite effects. On the one hand, it increases the probability of the availability of the
second variety at period 2. This probability is given by Λ(1− Λ) + (1− Λ)Λ + Λ2 and increases from
zero to one for Λ ∈ [0, 1]. Indeed, with probability Λ(1 − Λ), the R&D program of the incumbent
breeder is the only one to succeed, with probability (1−Λ)Λ the R&D program of the new breeder is
the only one to succeed and, finally, with probability Λ2 both programs succeed. On the other hand,
as stresses the last term in the expression of the probability that variety n = 2 is available in period
2, there is a risk of an inefficient duplication of the R&D investment cost FC. In this last case, the
rights on the second variety are assumed to be randomly affected to one of the two breeders.
Table 4: The matrix of the game for the incremental invention
Incumbent
R&D
Incumbent
no R&D
Entrant
R&D
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛
V
E
1
V
I
1
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛❛
V
E
2
V
I
2
Entrant
no R&D
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛
V
E
3
V
I
3
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛
❛❛
V
E
4
V
I
4
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Depending on the decision of each breeder to engage in R&D, four situations may arise. These
situations, referred to as situation s1 to s4, correspond to the four cells in Table 4. V
I
si
and V Esi
respectively denote the expected flow of profit of the incumbent breeder and of the entrant in situation
si. The first situation (s1) correspond to an engagement of both breeders in R&D. The entrant then
competes to obtain the flow of profit voli2 generated by the supply of variety n = 2 given that varieties
1 and 2 are supplied in an oligopolistic market structure. Accordingly, we have
V E1 = (1− Λ)
20 + Λ(1− Λ)0 + (1− Λ)Λ voli2 + Λ
2(
1
2
voli2 +
1
2
0)− FC (24)
For his part, the incumbent can switch to a monopolistic position with variety n = 2 if he wins
the innovation race, or switch to an oligopolistic position where he supplies the lower quality variety
n = 1 if the entrant wins the innovation race, or stay on a monopolistic position if neither him nor the
new breeder succeed in obtaining variety n = 2. Thus, we have
V I1 =(1− Λ)
2vmon1 + Λ(1− Λ)v
mon
2 + (1− Λ)Λv
oli
2
+ Λ2(
1
2
voli1 +
1
2
vmon2 )− FC
(25)
Where voli1 stands for the flow of profit generated by the supply of variety n = 1 given that varieties 1
and 2 are supplied in an oligopolistic market structure.Following the same logic, we obtain that
V E2 = Λv
oli
2 + (1− Λ)0− FC (26)
V I2 = Λv
oli
1 + (1− Λ)v
mon
1 − FC (27)
and
V E3 = 0 (28)
V I3 = Λv
mon
2 + (1− Λ)v
mon
1 − FC (29)
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Finally, the last situation (s4) is the simplest and is characterised by
V E4 = 0 (30)
V I4 = v
mon
1 (31)
The outcome of the Nash game for the incremental invention described in Table 4 crucially depends
on the value of the different parameters. We make a special emphasis on the sensitivity analysis with
respect to the parameters Λ and FC that are specific to the dynamic framework.
4.1.3 Outcome of the game for an incremental variety
Using the numerical results of section 4.3, the Nash equilibrium that emerges with a PBRs system
from the four strategic decisions presented in Table 4 are determined for different values of Λ on the
range ]0, 1] and different values of the fixed R&D cost on the range ]0, 100]. Results are showed in
figure 3. Multiple equilibria are possible. In such an event, either only the incumbent invests or only
the entrant invests but there is an indeterminacy of who exactly invest. Figure 3 also presents the
frontier above which incentives to innovate under a patent regime are sufficient for the incumbent to
invest at period 2. This frontier is defined by the inequality (23).
The two Nash equilibria that more commonly occur are situations s1 and s4. The first situation is
characteristic of a high probability of success and low R&D costs whereas the second situation occurs
in the opposite context. Unsurprisingly, situation s1 emerges as a Nash equilibrium for combinations of
Λ and FC above the frontier associated to the patent regime and conversely for situation s4. Situation
s3 where the incumbent breeder is the only one that engage in R&D emerges as a Nash equilibrium
for a high probability of success and a high R&D cost that would justify engagement in R&D under a
patent regime. Multiple equilibria occur when the probability of success is slightly lower compared to
those cases where s3 is the sole Nash equilibrium. As regards the impact of commercialisation rules,
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Figure 3: Nash equilibria and innovation frontiers
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(b) Catalogue
the choice between minimum standards on the one hand and a catalogue on the other hand seems
to have a limited impact on the outcome of the innovation game. Situations where both breeders
innovate are slightly more abundant in the catalogue case. Interestingly, Figure 3 exhibits cases where
the entrant is the only one to engage in a R&D program under a PBRs regime (situation s2 in Table 4),
whereas the incumbent chooses not to invest under patent regime. In this sense, PBRs better promote
incremental innovation compared to patents.
The optimal choice of the type of IPRs used to protect variety creation and of the type of commercial
rules has been computed for each combination of values of Λ and FC given the outcome of the Nash
game reported in Table 4. This optimal choice has to be understood as the outcome of a Stackelberg
game. Indeed, breeders decide to invest or not in a R&D program and choose their price given the
IPRs regime and the commercialisation rule set by the public regulator. Given the optimal response
of breeders, the public regulator chooses the combination of IPRs and commercialisation rule that
maximises the total surplus. Figure 4 indicates what is this optimal pair of IPRs and commercialisation
rule the public regulator should choose at period 2. Only three pair of rules are present: PBRs with
minimum standards, PBRs (or indifferently patents) with minimum standards and, finally, PBRs
coupled with a catalogue.
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Figure 4: Optimal choice of IPRs and commercial rules at period 2 for the public regulator
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The more effective pair of rules regarding the optimal welfare seems to be the coupling of PBRs
with minimum standards even if, for some rare combinations of Λ and FC, a catalogue is preferable for
commercial rules. The point is that patents never emerge as an optimal system of IPRs for the public
regulator or, at least, never strictly dominates PBRs. The optimal coupling of PBRs with minimum
standards is the most represented in our results over the different levels of the sunk R&D cost and of
the probability of success. Moreover, even if there is no competition (only the incumbent invests) a
PBRs system provides a total welfare similar to that provided by a patent system. More surprisingly,
for some pair of parameters, the catalogue rule coupled with PBRs provides a higher total welfare
than minimum standards coupled with PBRs. Such a result more specifically arises along the frontier
above which a monopolist would engage in R&D under a patent regime. The reason for this is that
a catalogue may rise profit flows compared to minimum standards and, consequently, may favour the
obtention of the new plant variety.
4.2 Incentives for a radical invention
When turning to the decision of breeders to engage in R&D for the initial drastic invention at period
1 (obtention of variety n = 1), two important differences arises compared to the decision to engage in
R&D for the increment invention at period 2 (obtention of variety n = 2). The first difference is the
symmetric position of each of the two breeders. The second difference is that expected profit flows of
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the two consecutive periods have to be accounted for when determining the monetary incentives to
engage in R&D at period 1. Assuming that the sunk cost of R&D is similar at the two periods, the
expected discounted sum of profit flows associated with the R&D investment at period one under a
patent regime amounts to
Vpatents =(1− Λ)
2(Max{
(1− Λ)Λvmon1 +
Λ2
2 v
mon
1 − FC
1 + r
; 0})
+ ((1− Λ)Λ +
Λ2
2
)
∗ (vmon1 +
Max{(1− Λ)vmon1 + Λv
mon
2 − FC ; v
mon
1 }
1 + r
)− FC
(32)
where r is the discount rate. Indeed, if none of the two breeders succeeds in obtaining the first variety
n = 1 at period 1 (probability (1−Λ)2), a new innovation race occurs at period 2 for the same variety
and generates a profit flow vmon1 at period 2 if the breeder wins the race. If the breeder is the only
one to succeeds in period 1 (probability (1 − Λ)Λ) or if the two breeders succeeds in period 1 but
the patent is randomly allocated to the breeder (probability Λ2/2 to succeed and to be granted the
property right), then the profit flow is received at period 1 and is augmented by the discounted net
profit flow associated with the optimal decision to engage in R&D in order to obtain variety n = 2 or
not at period 2.
Under a PBRs regime, the equivalent to (32) is given by
VPBRs =(1− Λ)
2(Max{
(1− Λ)Λvmon1 + Λ
2 1
2v
mon
1 − FC
1 + r
; 0})
+ Λ(1− Λ)
V ENash
1 + r
+ (1− Λ)Λ(vmon1 +
V INash
1 + r
)
+ Λ2(
1
2
(vmon1 +
V INash
1 + r
) +
1
2
V ENash
1 + r
)− FC
(33)
where V INash (respectively V
E
Nash) stands for the expected profit flow of the incumbent breeder (re-
spectively the entrant) at period 2 given the outcome of the Nash equilibrium of the innovation game
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for obtaining variety n = 2.
We have to rely on numerical results in order to assess which combination of IPRs and commer-
cialisation rules yields the higher expected and discounted sum of total surplus in an intertemporal
perspective and may thus be chosen by the public regulator. Figure 5 and 6 synthesises the result in
function of the probability Λ of success of R&D programs and of the sunk cost FC of R&D, under the
assumption that the discount rate from period 1 to period 2 amounts to 10%. Such a discount rate
may seem rather high but actually applies to the lapse of time required to develop the incremental
variety generally exceeds one year.
Figure 5: Innovation at period 1
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Figure 6: Optimal choice of IPRs and commercial rules at period 1 for a public regulator
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Figure 5 shows that it is more often optimal not to invest in the obtention of the initial variety
with minimum standards than with a catalogue. This result is expected because minimum standards
strengthen the threat on monopolistic rents and consequently reduce the monetary incentives to invest
in R&D. For a limited subset of the space {FC,Λ}, a patent regime is required for innovation to occur
at period 1. Such situations are encountered when both the R&D sunk cost FC and the probability Λ
of R&D success are high, or at the limit with the area for which investing in R&D to obtain the initial
breeder variety is not optimal. In such cases, it is optimal for the public regulator to avoid replication
of R&D sunk costs in order to ensure that investment occurs, which is obtained by granting stronger
property rights in the form of patents rather PBRs. Note that for higher values of FC and Λ (on
the right and top of the Figure), innovation occurs whether IPRs correspond to PBRs or patents
because, at period 2, PBRs and patents are equivalent (only the incumbent invests at period 2). The
combination of IPRs regime and commercialisation rule that a public regulator should use is illustrated
by Figure 6. Below an ascendant diagonal in space {FC,Λ}, none of the four possible combinations
will create enough incentives for investing in the obtention of the initial breeder variety. Above this
frontier, there is a clear distinction between an area where PBRs have to be preferred to patents and
conversely. Roughly speaking, PBRs are optimal from the view point of the regulator when FC is
inferior to a parabolic expression of Λ. The parabolic form results form the requirement that Λ has to
be sufficiently high to make sure investment will occur at periods 1 and 2 with PBRs but not too high so
that the probability Λ2 of an inefficient duplication of R&D investment does not increase too much and
does not justifies adopting patents rather than PBRs to avoid the negative impact of this replication
on the total surplus. Results as regards commercialisation rules are less clear. A catalogue rule may
be optimal close to the frontier under which investing at period 1 is never optimal. The catalogue is
then used in combination with patents to enhance the amount of rents that accrue to the monopolistic
breeder and create enough monetary incentives to innovate. More surprisingly, a catalogue may be
chosen by the regulator in combination with either PBRs or patents along a thick ray that split the area
where a combination of PBRs and minimum standards dominates. A decomposition of the simulation
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results indicates that this is due to the Max term in the first line of equations (32) and (33) which
yields the expected profit of a breeder associated to R&D investment at period 2 when none of the
R&D programs has succeeded at period 1. For a fixed value FC of sunk costs of R&D, this maximum
will be strictly positive if and only if Λ is sufficiently close to one. If Λ is not sufficiently close to one,
a switch from minimum standards to a catalogue increases vmon1 and limits the risk of non innovation
at all on the two periods. The highest the value of FC the highest the risk of no innovation at all on
the two periods. Therefore, an increase in FC may justify to switch from PBRs to patents in addition
to the switch from minimum standards to a catalogue. With this respect, our simulation results are
consistent with the conclusion set by Moschini and Yerokhin (2008); Yerokhin and Moschini (2008).
A noticeable point that is highlighted by Figure 6 is that our simulations results support the coupling
of PBRs and minimum standards which encountered neither in the US nor in Europe when sunk costs
of R&D FC are low and the coupling of patents and minimum standards when these sunk costs are
high. This latter case more or less corresponds to the solution adopted in the US. By contrast, the
solution adopted in Europe (i.e. a coupling of PBRs and a catalogue) is supported by our simulation
results only in few specific cases. Such a result is all the more striking that the model is calibrated in
French data for wheat.
5 Conclusion
The dynamic vertical differentiation model developed in this article to tackle with both the problem
of asymmetric information and the problem of a lack of incentives to innovate on the seed market,
in connection with the role of biodiversity as a public good subject to under-provision, suggests that
the combination of IPRs regime and commercialisation rule that a public regulator may choose to
maximise the expected and discounted total surplus crucially depends on the level of sunk R&D costs
and on the probability of R&D success.
Numerical simulations obtained with a calibration of the model for wheat in France more or less confirm
the intuitive idea that PBRs combined to minimum standards have to be preferred when sunk costs of
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R&D are low or medium and the probability of R&D success is sufficiently high to justify investment
in R&D programs. Otherwise, patents combined with minimum standards have to be preferred, except
in some peculiar cases where patents may preferably be coupled with a catalogue. Though calibrated
on French data, our model thus only weakly supports the coupling of PBRs and a catalogue adopted
in Europe. Our simulation results better support the coupling of patents and minimum standards that
may be considered as close to the solution adopted in the US or, even, the novel solution consisting in
coupling PBRs and minimum standards.
A result for the model developed in this article has not yet been discussed. According to the
model, landrace seeds are chosen by non-productive farms (farms with a small productive parameter
A), while industrial seeds are chosen by all other farmers. We can see that the wide difference in terms
of intellectual property rights on plants between developing countries and developed countries may be
because the average farm size is very different between the two kinds of countries. Developing countries
still have many low productive farms for which there is a large production of farm-saved seeds while
farmers in developed countries are pushed to buy industrial seeds. The modelling also gives this result
because it is difficult for non-productive farms to pay high industrial seed prices. Furthermore, it would
be interesting to try this model with crops other than the wheat in order to see if the consequences of
the catalogue and the choice of the intellectual property right system on this model would be similar.
A Comparative statics of oligopoly prices with respect to c0 and
σ0 when N = 2
Substituting c0 for w0, the reaction functions for the Bertrand-Nash game in prices are given by:
w1 =
c1
2
+
w2
2
(µ1 − θσ1)− (µ0 − θσ0)
(µ2 − θσ2)− (µ0 − θσ0)
+
c0
2
(µ2 − θσ2)− (µ1 − θσ1)
(µ2 − θσ2)(µ0 − θσ0)
(34)
w2 = P α
(µ2 − θσ2)(µ1 − θσ1)
2
Amax +
c2
2
+
w1
2
(35)
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We differentiate the two reaction functions with respect to c0 and w0 in the neighborough of the
equilibrium:
dw1 =
∂w1
∂c0
dc0 +
∂w1
∂σ0
dσ0 +
∂w1
∂w2
dw2 (36)
dw2 = 0dc0 + 0dσ0 +
1
2
dw1 (37)
The second relation just states that variations of w2 are half those of w1. Moreover, given that µi
increases with i whereas σi decreases with i, one easily checks that in the above equations we have
∂w1
∂w2
=
1
2
(µ1 − θσ1)− (µ0 − θσ0)
(µ2 − θσ2)− (µ0 − θσ0)
∈ [0,
1
2
] (38)
∂w1
∂c0
=
(µ2 − θσ2)− (µ1 − θσ1)
2(µ2 − θσ2)− (µ0 − θσ0)
∈ [0,
1
2
] (39)
∂w1
∂σ0
= θ(
w2 + c0
2
)
(µ2 − θσ2)− (µ1 − θσ1)
((µ2 − θσ2)− (µ0 − θσ0))2
> 0 (40)
We conclude that dw1
dc0
> 0 and dw1
dσ0
> 0 so that, in the neighborough of {σ0, c0} we have the same
type of isoprice curves than under a patent regime. As the demand system is the same under a PBRs
system and a patent regime, we also conclude that in the neighborough of {σ0, c0} the isoquant curves
are of the same type than under a patent regime..
B Isoprofit equation for the first "breeder" variety
As we highlighted in section 3.2.1 the unit cost has to be a convex function of the quality in order to
obtain a multi-product monopoly. We examine the isoprofit of the first "breeder" variety to look at
consequences of this convexity or this non-convexity.
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v1 = (w
∗
1 − c1)q1 (41)
where q1 =
(
w2−w1
Pα(η2−η1)
− w1−w0
Pα(η1−η0)
)
∗
M∗L∗ 1
α
Amax−Amin
To construct the figure 2 we rearrange the profit equation and we obtain the isoprofit equation
w2 = w1 + w1
η2 − η1
η1 − η0
− w0
η2 − η1
η1 − η0
+ v1
Pα(η2 − η1)
w1 − c1
Amax −Amin
M ∗ L ∗ 1
α
(42)
The first and the second degree of partial derivatives of the isoprofit is analysed to determine the
isoprofit curve shape
∂w2
∂w1
= 1 +
η2 − η1
η1 − η0
− v1
Pα(η2 − η1)
(w1 − c1)2
Amax −Amin
M ∗ L ∗ 1
α
(43)
∂2w2
∂w21
= +2v1
Pα(η2 − η1)
(w1 − c1)3
Amax −Amin
M ∗ L ∗ 1
α
(44)
The first-degree is negative and the second-degree is positive, thus the isoprofit curve is convex
when the monopoly is multi-product (as figure 2 in section 3.2.3).
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